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I. INTRODUCTION
Dating back to the Radio Act of 1927, Congress has prohibited the
presentation of indecent programming by over-the-air broadcasters. While
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
enforcement of its indecency prohibition has been generally infrequent and
low-key, the climate changed dramatically in 2004, when there was an
explosion of viewer and listener complaints against radio and television
stations and a concomitant increase in FCC enforcement action.
Nearly three decades ago, the Supreme Court, recognizing that
indecent speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, nonetheless
upheld over First Amendment challenges the Commission's authority to
regulate indecent programming on over-the-air broadcast stations.
According to the Court, the "uniquely pervasive presence" of the broadcast
medium in American life and the fact that broadcasting is "uniquely
accessible to children" warrant limitation of the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters.'
The vast majority of viewers today receive video programming from
multichannel video programming providers-mostly cable television or
direct broadcast satellite ("DBS")-rather than directly over-the-air from
broadcast stations. While the FCC has not hesitated to sanction
broadcasters for what it deems to be indecent content, it consistently has
found that it lacks the authority to regulate indecency on subscription
services like cable television. Citizens groups and some in Congress now
seek to extend indecency restrictions to DBS services under existing law or
through the enactment of new legislation. It is true that DBS, because of its
use of radio spectrum to deliver programming to consumers, does share
some similarities with broadcasting. z Although the Supreme Court has not
1. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
2. While cable operators use spectrum (both satellite and terrestrial) to receive
programming from distributors, they do not use radio spectrum in delivering content to
subscribers.
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considered the issue, we believe that the nature of the DBS service more
closely resembles cable television than broadcasting. Assuming that the
FCC has statutory authority to regulate indecency on DBS (which is itself
doubtful), Supreme Court precedent regarding the regulation of content on
cable and the Internet strongly suggests that any restriction on DBS
indecency would contravene the First Amendment.
II. CONTENT REGULATION AND CALLS FOR EXPANSION
A. Pressure to Extend Broadcast Indecency Regulation to Cable
and DBS
The Janet Jackson "wardrobe malfunction" in early 2004 ignited a
crusade against broadcast indecency by various citizens' groups, such as
the Parents Television Council ("PTC").3 After successfully inciting greater
FCC enforcement action against broadcasters (primarily by inundating the
agency with form complaints), these groups took aim at the cable and DBS
industries. On February 1, 2005, the PTC launched a campaign to call
attention to indecent content on basic cable at a press conference on Capitol
Hill.
4
Lawmakers in both the House and Senate have also called for a crack
down on cable and satellite indecency, while urging these multichannel
video program distributors ("MVPDs") to provide consumers with better
programming options. At one point, Senator Ted Stevens, then-Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and
others voiced strong support for regulating indecency on cable and DBS.5
However, using the threat of legislation, Senator Stevens began to favor
industry action such as the creation of "family tiers" that would exclude
more objectionable programming channels.6 In addition, Senators
Rockefeller and Hutchison introduced S. 616, the "Indecent and Gratuitous
and Excessively Violent Programming Control Act of 2005." S. 616 not
3. During a halftime performance at the 2004 Super Bowl broadcast on the CBS
television network, Justin Timberlake removed part of Janet Jackson's costume, revealing
for an instant her breast. The incident was dubbed a "wardrobe malfunction," and the FCC
imposed a $550,000 fine on CBS. See In re Complaints Against Various Television
Licensees Concerning Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVII
Halftime Show, Forfeiture Order, 21 FCC Rcd 2760 (2006), affirmed on recon., 21 FCC Rcd
6653 (2006), appeal pending, CBS Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 06-
3575 (3d Cir. 2006).
4. Press Release, Parents Television Council, New PTC Study Finds MTV Blatantly
Selling Smut to Children (Feb. 1, 2005), available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC
/publications/release/2005/0201 .asp.
5. Ted Hearn, Stevens Adds Cable to Indecency Jihad, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 7,
2005, at 1,32.
6. Amol Sharma, Focusing On A Fresh Start, CONG. Q. WKLY., Jan. 2, 2006, at 55.
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only sought to expand current broadcast indecency penalties, but also to
apply them to cable and DBS providers. The bill also would have regulated
"excessively violent" video programming and supplanted the current,
voluntary indecency rating system. 7 More recently, legislation was
introduced in the House that would require cable and DBS operators to
accept broadcast indecency standards or, in the alternative, enhance access
to family-friendly programming with expanded family tiers or by offering
subscribers the ability to select individual channels .
Suggesting that the Commission will take its lead from Congress,
Chairman Martin, in his first speech as Chairman, said that "the
Commission is a creature of Congress, and it's Congress that ends up trying
to determine whether or not the rules on indecency should be applied to
cable." 9 While it appears that any new indecency laws will come from
Congress rather than the FCC, Chairman Martin nevertheless has publicly
pushed for cable and DBS to agree voluntarily to address the problem.'0 At
a forum on decency held by the Senate Commerce Committee in November
of 2005, the Chairman testified that he has "urged the industry to
voluntarily" offer family-friendly programming packages or to accept
indecency restrictions on their basic tier of programming."
While appearing before Congress in April of 2005, Chairman Martin
was asked what he thought about the regulation of indecency on satellite
radio, and he said, "whenever you talk about applying any kind of
indecency to a subscription service, it raises constitutional concerns." 2
Commissioner Adelstein has also expressed similar concern about
extending indecency regulation to satellite services:
Right now everybody is concerned about indecency .... But if a
person can find less restrictive means to prevent exposure then the
govt. can't impose restrictions on free speech .... [I]t's very difficult
7. Indecent and Gratuitous and Excessively Violent Programming Control Act of
2005, S. 616, 109th Cong. (2005).
8. See Kara Rowland, Bill Seeks to Give Viewers an Option; No Charge for Blocked
Channels, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 2007.
9. Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Fed. Comm'ns Comm'n, Remarks at National Cable
and Telecommunications Association Convention: Conversation with Fox News Channel
Journalist Stuart Varney (Apr. 5, 2005), available at http://fallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publicd
attachmatch/DOC-258104AI .pdf.
10. Open Forum on Decency: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transp., 109th Cong. 9-12 (Nov. 29, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.commerce.
senate.gov/pdf/decency2.pdf).
11. Id.
12. Drew Clark, FCC Chief Will Press Firms To Act On Indecency Controls,
CONGRESsDAILYAM, Apr. 27, 2005, http://nationaljoumal.com/cgi-bin/ifetch4?ENG+
CONGRESS- -NJMAG+7-cd0097+1191062-REVERSE+0+0+43700+F+3+3+1 +fcc+AND
+PD%2f04%2-f26%2f2OO5%2d%3e04%2f28%2f2005.
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to move in that direction . . . . We run into major constitutional
issues. 13
In an apparent attempt to stave off the new push for cable content
regulation, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association
("NCTA") launched a comprehensive $250 million campaign "to help
families manage their home TV viewing and protect children from
programming their parents may find inappropriate for them."'14 Not
surprisingly, the PTC immediately attacked the campaign and cited a
previous study it conducted alleging that the current ratings system is
deficient. 5 The cable industry claims that these attacks are unfounded
because of plans to improve the ratings system by implementing a number
of enhancements.
The TV ratings icon that is displayed on the upper left portion of the
TV screen for the first 15 seconds of rated programs will be enlarged
by 70 percent so it is more visible to the viewer.
Coming out of every commercial break, cable networks will begin
inserting a TV ratings icon on the screen to alert viewers of the TV
rating throughout the program.16
In addition, "[c]able networks will provide on their websites [sic]
information about the TV ratings system including program ratings in their
online TV schedules and descriptions of the ratings system, and the V-
chip. ' ' 7
More targeted blocking based on ratings is possible because of the
congressionally mandated V-Chip. As part of the deployment of the V-
Chip, in 1997, the Commission approved voluntary guidelines submitted by
the entertainment industry to rate programming that contains sexual,
violent, or indecent material and implemented a system to facilitate the
transmission of the ratings in such a way that enables parents and other
13. FCC Wants DBS and Satellite Radio to Compete with Terrestrials, Others,
COMMC'N DAILY, June 2, 2005 (copy of electronic article on file with author).
14. Press Release, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, U.S. Cable Industry Launches
"Take Control. It's Easy" Campaign to Help Parents Manage Their Family's TV Viewing
(Apr. 27, 2005), available at http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx?hidenavlink
-true&type-reltyp 1 &contentld=3 69.
15. Press Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Calls NCTA's Announcement a
$250 Million Sham (Apr. 27, 2005), available at http://www.parentstv.org/ptc/publications/
release/2005/0427.asp.
16. Press Release, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Fact Sheet: Cable's Commitment
to Help Parents Control Their Family TV Viewing (Apr. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.ncta.com/pdffiles/Fact-Sheet-on-Cables-PledgePDF_4-27-05.pdf.
17. Id.
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consumers to block the display of programming they determine is
inappropriate for them or their children.
1 8
DBS similarly provides a full range of robust parental content
controls. In addition to passing through the V-Chip ratings, DIRECTV
provides every customer with a free "Parental Controls" feature, which
enables parents to restrict access at designated times to certain
programming and to specific channels they consider inappropriate for
family members. 9 DISH offers a similar service with parental control
features.20 These systems supplement the ability of cable and satellite to
block completely any specific channel.
Actual use of these systems, however, is another matter. "[O]nly 15
percent of parents use the V-chip that's built into new TV sets ... [a] Pew
study found. Half of parents don't know they even have a V-chip."'21 It
remains to be seen if the recent push to promote the availability of these
systems will increase their usage. In any event, the ratings system and other
technologies that assist parents in regulating what their children watch on
television will play an important role in determining what, if any,
government regulation of content on MVPDs is constitutionally
permissible.
B. Current Content Regulation
Federal criminal law prohibits the utterance of "any obscene,
18. See In re Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, Notice of
Inquiry, 19 F.C.C.R. 14394, 14394 n.2 (2004) [hereinafter Violent Television Programming
Notice].
The ratings system, also known as the TV Parental Guidelines, was established by
the National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Television
Association, and the Motion Picture Association of America. These ratings are
displayed on the television screen for the first 15 seconds of rated programming
and, in conjunction with the V-Chip, permit parents to block programming with a
certain rating from coming into their home. The TV ratings system has been in
place since 1997. It was designed to give parents more information about the
content and age-appropriateness of TV shows.
NBC, V-Chip/TV Ratings, http://www.nbc.com/nbc/footer/v-chip/tvratings.shtml (last
visited September 24, 2007). A program can be rated TV-Y (All Children); TV-Y7
(Directed to Older Children); TV-Y7-FV (Directed to Older Children-Fantasy Violence);
TV-G (General Audience); TV-PG (Parental Guidance Suggested); TV-14 (Parents Strongly
Cautioned); or TV-MA (Mature Audience Only). Id.
19. See DIRECTV, Parental Controls, http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/global/content
Page.jsp?assetld=900007 (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
20. See Dish Network, Parental Controls, http://www.dishnetworkproducts.com/
products/parental controls.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
21. Marilyn Rauber, Shielding Young Eyes from Sex, Violence, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH,
May 1, 2005, at A-1.
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indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication. 22
Congress, moreover, has given the Commission the authority to impose
administrative sanctions for violations of the criminal statute. Section 503
of the Communications Act of 1934 ("Act") states, in pertinent part, that
any person who "willfully or repeatedly fail[s] to comply" with any rule,
regulation, or order issued by the Commission, or who violates 18 U.S.C. §
1464, "shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty. '23 As
used in § 503 of the Act, the term "willful" means that the "violator knew it
was taking the action in question, irrespective of any intent to violate the
Commission's rules. 24 The Commission's rule implementing this statute
states: "No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall
broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. any material which is
indecent. 25 Indecency is defined as the broadcast of patently offensive
material that depicts or describes sexual or excretory organs or activities.
26
Patent offensiveness is "measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium., 27 In implementing 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the
Commission did not purport to regulate indecent programming on cable or
DBS.
21
A separate statutory provision governs the presentation of obscene,
but not indecent or profane, material on cable television and subscription
services on television. 18 U.S.C. § 1468 makes it a crime to "knowingly
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). Violators are subject to fines and imprisonment of up to
two years. Id. Although § 1464 is a criminal law, the Commission has authority to impose
civil penalties for the broadcast of indecent material without regard to the criminal nature of
the statute. See In re Indus. Guidance On the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. §
1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C. R.
7999, n.2 (2001) [hereinafter Indecency Policy Statement].
23. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B), (D) (2000).
24. In re Telemundo of Puerto Rico License Corp., Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, 16 F.C.C.R. 7157, 7160 (2001).
25. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(b) (2006). Indecent content, in contrast to obscene content, is
entitled to some First Amendment protection. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has held,
however, that restricting the broadcast of indecent programming to the 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. safe
harbor period is a properly tailored means of furthering the government's compelling interest
in the welfare of children. Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 20 at para. 5 (citing
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). A
broadcast licensee is prohibited from airing obscene material at any time of day. Indecency
Policy Statement, supra note 20, at para. 3. Obscene material is defined by a three-part test:
(1) an average person, applying contemporary community standards, must find that the
material, as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the material must depict or describe,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable law; and (3)
the material, taken as a whole, must lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
26. See Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 20, para. 4.
27. Id. at para. 8.
28. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2006). But cf 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (2000) (permitting cable
operators to prohibit indecent material on leased access channels).
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utter[] obscene language or distribute[] any obscene matter by means of
cable television or subscription services on television. 2 9 Similarly, 47
U.S.C. § 559 makes it a crime to "transmit[] over any cable system any
matter which is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the
United States. 30 States are also free to regulate obscenity on cable or
subscription services on television: § 1468 provides that no federal law "is
intended to interfere with or preempt the power of the States ... to regulate
the uttering of language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the
Constitution."
31
C. The Commission's Longstanding Refusal to Extend Its
Indecency Regulations to Subscription Media
Arguably, § 1464's prohibition on the transmission of indecent
material by means of radio communication could extend to DBS and
satellite radio, or even cable, to the extent that it uses radio spectrum to
receive programming services, which it then delivers to subscribers through
cable headends. However, the Commission consistently has declined
invitations to regulate indecency on subscription services.32 Most recently,
the Commission denied a late-filed petition to deny the AT&T/Comcast
transfer application, which, among other things, alleged that AT&T had
distributed obscene material over one of its cable systems.33 Citing its 1988
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (2000).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 559 (2000). Section 1468 was enacted because it was "unclear under
what circumstances, if any, the federal government could enforce Section 639 [of 47 U.S.C.
§ 559] .... H.R. Doc. No. 100-129, at 93 (1987).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1468(c).
32. See, e.g., In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses from
Comcast Corp. and AT&T Corp. to AT&T Comcast Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23246, para. 213 (2002) [hereinafter AT&T/Comcast Transfer
Application]; Violent Television Programming Notice, supra note 16, at para. 21.
("Indecency regulation is only applied to broadcast services," not cable); In re Litigation
Recovery Trust, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 21852, para. 8 (2002)
[hereinafter Litigation Recovery Trust]; Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 20, para. 4
(citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997), and noting that the Supreme Court has
"recognized the 'special justifications for regulating the broadcast media that are not
applicable to other speakers."'); In re Applications of Harriscope of Chicago, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 757, para. 5 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter
Harriscope Order]. See also In re Various Complaints Regarding CNN's Airing of the 2004
Democratic National Convention, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 6070
(2005) [hereinafter CNN Order] (issued by the Chief of the Enforcement Bureau); In re
Various Complaints Against the Cable/Satellite Television Program "Nip/Tuck",
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4255 (2005) [hereinafter Nip/Tuck Order]
(issued by the Chief of the Enforcement Bureau); Letter from W. Kenneth Ferree, Chief,
Media Bureau, to Saul Levine, Mt. Wilson FM Broadcasters, Inc., Published Letter, 19
F.C.C.R. 24069 (2004) [hereinafter Ferree Letter].
33. AT&T/Comcast Transfer Application, supra note 32, at para. 209.
DBS CONTENT REGULATION
decision in Harriscope and its 2001 Indecency Policy Statement, the
Commission concluded that "[t]o the extent that the petition describes
programming that might be considered indecent, we note that the services
provided by AT&T are not broadcast services, but subscription-based
services, which do not call into play the issue of indecency.
'34
The Harriscope decision cited by the Commission addressed a
challenge in a comparative renewal proceeding to Harriscope's use of its
license to provide late-night adult films as part of its over-the-air
subscription television ("STV") service.35 To receive the STV service,
"viewers were required to make an affirmative decision to purchase the
programming in question and had to obtain a special decoding device to
unscramble the STV signal. 36 In confirming that the case did not raise the
issue of indecency, the Commission stated that, "[c]onsistent with existing
case law, the Commission does not impose regulations regarding indecency
on services lacking the indiscriminate access to children that characterizes
broadcasting. 3 7 The existing case law to which the Commission referred
consisted of two circuit court decisions that struck down local regulations
designed to restrict cable indecency. While these judicial decisions did not
address specifically the scope of § 1464, they made clear that the regulation
of indecency on any medium that lacks indiscriminate access to children
(e.g., a subscription service) is constitutionally suspect.38
34. Id. at para. 213 (citing Harriscope Order, supra note 32, at para. 5 n.2).
35. See Harriscope Order, supra note 32, at paras. 3-5.
36. Id. at para. 5. The subscription television format has been defunct for many years.
In re Application of Harriscope of Chicago, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8
F.C.C.R. 2753, para. 20 (1993).
37. Harriscope Order, supra note 32, at para. 5 n.2 (citing Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415
(1 th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the "subscription nature of cable television and other
technical capabilities of cable to restrict children's access to indecent cable programming
forecloses [a] municipality's ability to impose additional regulations on cable indecency"));
Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), affd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
38. In Cruz v. Ferre, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Miami ordinance
that prohibited a cable television system from knowingly distributing indecent material was
unconstitutionally overbroad and failed adequately to protect the Due Process rights of
violators. 755 F.2d at 1416. The court concluded that the judicial cornerstone of the
broadcast indecency regime, the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
(discussed below), was inapplicable to the cable regulation at issue. Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1421;
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). According to the Eleventh Circuit, "[t]he
[High] Court's concern with the pervasiveness of the broadcast media can best be seen in its
description of broadcast material as an 'intruder' into the privacy of the home. [Cable],
however, does not 'intrude' into the home." Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420. "Probably the more
important justification recognized in Pacifica for the FCC's authority to regulate the
broadcasting of indecent materials was the accessibility of broadcasting to children." Id. at
1420 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750). "This interest, however, is significantly weaker in
the context of cable television because parental manageability of cable television greatly
exceeds the ability to manage the broadcast media." Id. The Tenth Circuit's decision in
Jones v. Wilkinson was a per curiam opinion which affirmed the lower court's decision that
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Moreover, the Commission has not read the public interest obligations
of satellite licensees to be so broad as to permit regulation of indecent
programming. In October of 2002, the Commission denied a request by
Litigation Recovery Trust for a declaratory ruling that Comsat had violated
the public interest standards of the Communications Satellite Act by
transmitting obscene and indecent films via satellite to hotels through its
subsidiaries SpectraVision and On Command.39 The Commission noted
that the services provided by Comsat were not broadcast services and were
provided on a closed circuit basis within the confines of particular hotels.
Citing Harriscope and the Broadcast Indecency Policy Statement, the
Commission concluded that "[s]uch subscription-based services do not call
into play the issue of indecency. ' 4° The Commission also refused to
consider unadjudicated allegations that the material was obscene. "The
Commission has not previously interpreted the public interest standard to
proscribe the transmission of 'adult' programming that was not otherwise
unlawful pursuant to statute or regulation, and we decline to do so here. 'A'
Even Commissioner Copps, who concurred in the outcome but
dissented in part, recognized that "the [satellite] services at issue are not
broadcast services subject to the language of the indecency statutes. '42 But
unlike the majority, he wanted to make clear that these satellite services are
provided "by the holder of FCC licenses, who, like all licensees, is subject
to the general obligation to serve the public interest.' 43 Commissioner
Copps "could not support a decision that might preclude the Commission
from [regulating satellite services] in the future, should circumstances
warrant such an outcome.
'
"
In short, the Commission has ruled repeatedly that subscription
services, like DBS, are not subject to indecency regulation because they are
not indiscriminately accessible by children. In doing so, the Commission
has expressly relied upon Supreme Court precedent singling out only
a Utah law banning indecent material on cable was preempted by federal law. 800 F.2d at
990-91. The lower court noted that the "practical and critical distinction between Pacifica
and the present case is apparent: cable television is not an uninvited intruder." Cmty.
Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1113 (D. Utah 1985). The court
also cited Cruz v. Ferre and its conclusion that parents can significantly control their
children's access to cable. Id. at 1116.
39. Litigation Recovery Trust, supra note 32, at para. 1. Section 401 of the
Communications Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 741, made COMSAT "fully subject to the
provisions of title II [Common Carriers] and title III [Provisions Relating to Radio] of [the
Communications] Act." 47 U.S.C § 741 (2000).
40. Litigation Recovery Trust, supra note 32, at para. 8.
41. Id. at para. 9.
42. Id. at 21860 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting in part).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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broadcasting for reduced protection under the First Amendment.45 As
discussed below, nothing in more recent Supreme Court precedent suggests
that the Commission may now constitutionally change course and regulate
indecent content on DBS.
III. POSSIBLE STATUTORY BASIS FOR FCC REGULATION OF
INDECENCY ON DBS
A. Regulation of DBS and Cable Under § 1464 of the Criminal
Code or Section 1 of the Communications Act
Quite apart from the constitutional infirmities, the Commission would
be on shaky statutory footing if it attempted to regulate indecent content on
DBS. As noted above, § 1464 applies to transmission of obscene, indecent,
or profane material by means of radio communications and is not limited to
broadcasting. The statutory scheme suggests, however, that Congress did
not intend to regulate indecency on subscription services using radio
communications. In particular, Congress enacted § 1468 in 1988, which
prohibits only obscenity on subscription services on television.46 It would
have made little sense for Congress to enact § 1468 if such services were
already covered by the much broader language of § 1464 ("obscene,
indecent, or profane" programming), which dates back to the Radio Act of
1927. 47 Accordingly, the most reasonable interpretation of § 1464 is that it
applies only to broadcasting.a
45. See, e.g., Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 22.
46. When § 1468 was enacted in 1988, moreover, the only "subscription services on
television" were offered by terrestrial over-the-air broadcasters. See 73 C.F.R. § 73.641 et
seq. The first DBS operators did not begin service to subscribers until 1994. See Annual
Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, para. 16 (2004). Section 1468 was added shortly
after the FCC's decision in Harriscope.
47. See Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 723 (1966) ("The original prohibition
against 'obscene, indecent, or profane' language was enacted as section 29 of the Radio Act
of 1927, c. 169, 44 Stat. 1172."). Moreover, the heading of § 1464 is "[b]roadcasting
obscene language," 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (emphasis added), while § 1468 is entitled
"[d]istributing obscene material by cable or subscription television." 18 U.S.C. § 1468
(2000). Accepted rules of statutory construction, however, permit reliance on the heading of
a provision only if the language of the law itself is ambiguous. See Carter v. United States,
530 U.S. 255, 267 (2000) ("The title of a statute '[is] of use only when [it] sheds light on
some ambiguous word or phrase' in the statute itself." (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)). The term "radio communication" in §
1464, while not defined, does not appear to be particularly ambiguous. Thus, a court could
be expected to turn to the Communications Act and Title 47 for guidance, which contain a
very broad definition of "radio communication." "The term 'radio communication' or
'communication by radio' means the transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals,
pictures, and sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and
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The Commission alternatively might seek to justify regulation of
indecency under Section 1 of the Communications Act, which gives the
Commission authority to regulate "interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States... a rapid, efficient, Nation-
wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service." 49 In
addition, § 303(r) of the Act states that "the Commission from time to time,
as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall .... [m]ake
such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,
not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this chapter., 50 The Commission's efforts to adopt rules under its general
authority to regulate communications, however, increasingly have met
judicial resistance, particularly where the "regulations ... significantly
implicate program content.",5' Thus in Motion Picture Association of
America v. Federal Communications Commission ("MPAA"), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down FCC regulations
that required television broadcasters to deliver programming with video
description to enhance service to the visually impaired.5 2 The court rejected
the FCC's reliance on Section 1: it "has not been construed to allow the
FCC to regulate programming content . . . because such regulations
invariably raise First Amendment issues. 53 As discussed in detail below,
there is no question that indecent programming is entitled to First
Amendment protection, although broadcasting has received a lesser degree
of protection than other media. Yet under MPAA, the Commission may not
regulate the content of even broadcast programming under the auspices of
Section 1.54
services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications)
incidental to such transmission." 47 U.S.C. § 153 (33) (2000).
48. The Department of Justice has brought criminal indecency charges under § 1464
against citizen's band radio operators. See United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53 (1977);
Gagliardo, 366 F.2d at 720. Like broadcasting, CB radio, although defined as a two-way
private communication service in 46 C.F.R. § 95.401(a) (2006), is transmitted without
encryption and is accessible by children. The Commission's rules, moreover, expressly
prohibit indecent communication on CB radio. See 47 C.F.R. § 95.413(a)(2) (2006).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2000).
51. See, e.g., Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
52. See id. at 798; see also Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (holding that Title I of the Communications Act did not authorize the FCC to regulate
receiver apparatus after a transmission was complete, thus there was no statutory foundation
for the Commission's broadcast flag rules, and the FCC acted outside the scope of its
delegated authority).
53. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 309 F.3d at 805 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 651 (1994)).
54. Id.
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B. Regulation of Indecent Content on DBS in the Licensing Context
Finally, as Commissioner Copps suggested in his opinion in
Litigation Recovery Trust, the Commission could seek to regulate
indecency on DBS through its licensing process." Pursuant to § 309(a) of
the Communications Act, the Commission shall consider "whether the
public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served" by its grant or
renewal of a license.56 In order to deny an application in the DBS service,
however, the Commission would have to depart from its holdings in
AT&T/Comcast and Harriscope, both licensing proceedings, that it does
not consider indecency allegations with respect to subscription services.
Even assuming that the FCC has the statutory authority to regulate
indecent programming on DBS, it must supply a reasoned analysis in the
event it chooses to jettison the extensive precedent against regulating
indecent content on subscription services.5 7 It is difficult to discern what, if
any, logic would support a departure by the Commission from its
indecency enforcement policy at this point in time. The Commission in
Harriscope recognized that it was constrained by judicial interpretation of
the First Amendment, 8 and the justifications that warranted excluding
subscription services from the FCC's enforcement authority are only
stronger today. As the FCC has stated repeatedly, subscription satellite
services do not enter the home uninvited. Furthermore, since the FCC's
decision in Harriscope, technology has enhanced the ability of parents to
restrict children's access to indecent content. In short, the FCC would be
hard-pressed to offer up a rational explanation for a departure from its prior
conclusion that the First Amendment limits its authority to regulate
indecent content on subscription services.
55. The Commission has the authority to set broad policies either by adjudication or
through a rulemaking proceeding. See Cent. Tex. Tel. Co-op, Inc. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205,
210 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Agencies often have a choice of proceeding by adjudication rather
than rulemaking .... Orders handed down in adjudications may establish broad legal
principles.").
56. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000).
57. See AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("The FCC
'cannot silently depart from previous policies or ignore precedent' as it has done here.")
(citation omitted); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that
prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.").
58. Harriscope Order, supra note 32, at para. 5 n.2 (noting that the FCC must act in
accordance with existing case law).
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I IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF BROADCAST INDECENCY
REGULATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DBS AND CABLE
The underpinnings of broadcast indecency regulation date back nearly
three decades to the decision by a divided Supreme Court in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation.59 The Court upheld the Commission's determination
that George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue was indecent as
broadcast.60 The Court's opinion, though, was "an emphatically narrow
holding" 6 ' based on the "uniquely pervasive presence ' 62 of the broadcast
medium in the lives of all Americans and the fact that broadcasting is
"uniquely accessible to children" 63 -justifications that have been
undermined by the subsequent three decades of technological and
marketplace changes. In 1978, the Court was also concerned that while
"[o]ther forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young
without restricting the expression at its source,"64 broadcasting could not be
so limited.
The federal courts last considered the FCC's indecency standard for
broadcasting a decade ago. In Action for Children's Television v. FCC
("ACT I11"), the D.C. Circuit upheld the broadcast indecency standard
while recognizing that "[s]exual expression which is indecent but not
obscene is protected by the First Amendment."65 The court purportedly
applied strict scrutiny to the regulation, as it concluded it must "regardless
of the medium., 66 Under the "strict scrutiny" standard, "[t]he Government
may... regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest. '67 The court went on to state, however, that
its "assessment of whether [the law] survives that scrutiny must necessarily
take into account the unique context of the broadcast medium." 68 After
accepting the Pacifica rationale for limiting the First Amendment
protections of broadcasters, the court concluded that channeling indecent
broadcasts to the late-evening and early-morning hours was permissible.69
59. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
60. Id.
61. Sable Comnmc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989).
62. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
63. Id. at 749.
64. Id.
65. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
66. Id. at 660.
67. Id. at 659 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
68. Id. at 660.
69. Id. at 656.
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Even twelve years ago, though, Chief Judge Edwards contended that
the Pacifica analysis was no longer tenable. In a vigorous dissent in ACT
III, he noted that "[t]here is not one iota of evidence in the record ... to
support the claim that exposure to indecency is harmful."70 Moreover, he
said that the law effectively "involves a total ban of disfavored
programming during hours when adult viewers are most likely to be in the
audience.",7' He added that because the ban "is not the least restrictive
means to further compelling state interests, the majority decision must rest
primarily on a perceived distinction between the First Amendment rights of
broadcast media and cable (and all other non-broadcast) media. 72 But "it
is no longer responsible for courts to provide lesser First Amendment
protection to broadcasting" based on "alleged 'unique attributes'." 7
Moreover, he called it "incomprehensible" that the majority could be "blind
to the utterly irrational distinction that Congress has created between
broadcast and cable operators. 74 Chief Judge Edwards rejected the notion
that the two media have any distinguishing characteristics.
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit-Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC-failed to reach
constitutional challenges to the FCC's broadcast indecency regime but
rather was decided on narrower administrative law principles.75 The Fox
court held that the FCC's enforcement of a newly announced policy of
sanctioning the isolated or fleeting use of expletives was arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act and remanded the case
back to the Commission.76 Moreover, having discussed at length at oral
argument the constitutional challenges to the FCC's indecency regulations,
the court provided an analysis (which it expressly acknowledged was dicta)
that questioned whether the FCC's indecency test could survive First
Amendment scrutiny notwithstanding Pacifica.77 The court concluded that,
in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, it likely could not.78 In
particular, the court observed that if the High Court's decision in United
70. Id. at 671 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (citing Alliance for Cmty Media v. FCC, 56
F.3d 105, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting)).
71. Id. (emphasis in original).
72. Id. (emphasis in original).
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2007) [hereinafter Fox].
76. Id. at 446.
77. Id. at 462.
78. Id. at 466. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the FCC and the United States, filed a
petition for writ of certiorari in the case, creating an opportunity for Supreme Court review
of the FCC's current indecency regime. See Federal Communications Commission v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Supreme Court No. 07-582 (filed
Nov. 1, 2007).
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States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, discussed infra, "is any guide,
technological advances may obviate the constitutional legitimacy of the
FCC's robust [indecency] oversight., 79
V. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING REGULATION OF
CONTENT ON CABLE AND THE INTERNET AND THEIR
APPLICABILITY TO DBS
A. Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC
As the first in a series of cases that addressed the First Amendment
rights of cable television operators, the Supreme Court held in Turner
Broadcasting Systems v. FCC ("Turner F') that, unlike broadcasting, cable
television is entitled to full First Amendment protection.80 The Court was
considering a constitutional challenge brought by cable operators to the
must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"). Eight Justices agreed that the
justification for its "distinct approach to broadcast regulation rests upon the
unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium."8' Cable, they
concluded, may soon have no practical limitation on the number of
speakers who may use the medium, "[n]or is there any danger of physical
interference between two cable speakers attempting to share the same
channel.82 "In light of these fundamental technological differences
between broadcast and cable transmission, application of the more relaxed
standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is
inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of cable
regulation. 8 3 Five Justices, though, found the must-carry regulations
content-neutral and, therefore, subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.8
As a result, the statute was upheld.
79. Fox, 489 F.3d at 466.
80. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I].
81. Id. at 637.
82. Id. at 639.
83. Id. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983)) ("Our
decisions have recognized that the special interest of the Federal Government in regulation
of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a justification for regulation of other
means of communication.")). In Red Lion, the Court concluded that "[w]here there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate,
it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the
right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 388 (1969).
84. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (The Court will uphold a
content-neutral regulation of speech "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
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B. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC
Two years later, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, the Court appeared to retreat from the Turner I
analysis and its strong support for unlimited First Amendment protections
for the cable medium.8 5 Three provisions of the 1992 Cable Act were
before the Court. Section 10(a), which permits cable operators to prohibit
indecent material on leased access channels, was upheld in a plurality
opinion. 6 A nearly identical provision in § 10(c), which enabled cable
operators to prohibit indecent material on public access channels, and §
10(b), which required the segregation and blocking of certain "patently
offensive" programming channels unless a viewer requested access, were
found by the Court to violate the Constitution. 7
1. Section 10(a)
A Plurality Opinion: As part of the review of § 10(a), Justice Breyer's
plurality opinion (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Souter)
concluded:
The Court's distinction in Turner, ... between cable and broadcast
television, relied on the inapplicability of the spectrum scarcity
problem to cable. While that distinction was relevant in Turner to the
justification for structural regulations at issue there (the 'must carry'
rules), it has little to do with a case that involves the effects of
television viewing on children.
88
Citing Pacifica, the plurality also noted that cable television "is as
'accessible to children' as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so ...
[Cable has] 'established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans,"' and can "'confron[t] the citizen' in the 'privacy of the home,'
with little or no prior warning.'
8 9
The plurality also refused to be bound by prior First Amendment
standards of review. "[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies
(broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single
standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes.' 90 Moreover,
the Justices were clear that they had no interest in preventing government
from responding to serious problems. "This Court, in different contexts, has
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
85. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 748 (1996).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 748 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 744-45 (citation omitted).
90. Id. at741-42.
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consistently held that government may directly regulate speech to address
extraordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriately tailored to
resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction
on speech." 9' The plurality concluded that § 10(a) was justified by the
compelling need to protect children from exposure to sex-related material.92
"[T]he problem Congress addressed here is remarkably similar to the
problem addressed by the FCC in Pacifica, and the balance Congress
struck is commensurate with the balance we approved there., 93 Applying
the newly articulated standard, the plurality opinion concluded "that § 1 0(a)
is a sufficiently tailored response to an extraordinarily important
problem., 94 The Court then addressed a vagueness challenge and found
"that the statute is not impermissibly vague." 95
Concurring in the Outcome: Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, provided the necessary votes to uphold the §
10(a) grant of authority to cable operators to prohibit indecency on leased
access channels as constitutional, but they did not endorse Justice Breyer's
embrace of Pacifica in the context of cable. Justice Thomas thought that
the permissive nature of the regulation was enough to save it. "[Congress]
merely restore[d] part of the editorial discretion an operator would have
absent Government regulation .... ,, He then chastised the Court for not
articulating "how, and to what extent, the First Amendment protects cable
operators, programmers, and viewers from state and federal regulation." 97
In the process of deciding not to decide on a governing standard,
Justice Breyer purports to discover in our cases an expansive, general
principal permitting government to 'directly regulate speech to address
extraordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriately tailored
to resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great
restriction on speech.' This heretofore unknown standard is facially
subjective and openly invites balancing of asserted speech interests to a
degree not ordinarily permitted.
98
The Dissent: Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Ginsburg) concluded
that § 1 0(a) was unconstitutional. He too was troubled by the failure of the
plurality to apply an established standard of review. "The opinion treats
91. Id. at 741.
92. Id. at 743 (citing Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
756-57 (1982)).
93. Id. at 744.
94. Id. at 743.
95. Id. at 753.
96. Id. at 823 (Thomas, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 812.
98. Id. at 818 (referring to majority opinion).
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concepts such as public forum, broadcaster, and common carrier as mere
labels rather than as categories with settled legal significance; it applies no
standard, and by this omission loses sight of existing First Amendment
doctrine." 99 Justice Kennedy concluded that "the proper standard for
reviewing §§ 10(a) and (c) is strict scrutiny."' 00 He felt that:
Sections 10(a) and (c) present a classic case of discrimination against
speech based on its content. There are legitimate reasons why the
Government might wish to regulate or even restrict the speech at issue
here, but §§ 10(a) and (c) are not drawn to address those reasons with
the precision the First Amendment requires. 1l
2. Section 10(b)
An Opinion of the Court: Section 10(b) required cable operators to
segregate "patently offensive" leased-access programming on a single
channel and block the channel unless a subscriber requested access. Six
Justices (Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg)
voted to strike down the provision as unconstitutional. Justice Breyer,
delivering the opinion of the Court, appeared to apply strict scrutiny to the
regulation.
0 2
[O]nce one examines this governmental restriction, it becomes
apparent that, not only is it not a 'least restrictive alternative' and is not
'narrowly tailored' to meet its legitimate objective, it also seems
considerably 'more extensive than necessary.' That is to say, it fails to
satisfy this Court's formulations of the First Amendment's 'strictest,'
as well as its somewhat less 'strict,' requirements. 1
03
While recognizing "that protection of children is a 'compelling
interest,"' 1 4 the Court felt that provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 ("1996 Act") like the V-Chip and § 505, which required "cable
operators to 'scramble or ... block' such [indecent] programming on any
(unleased) channel 'primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented
99. Id. at 780-81 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 805.
101. Id. at 807.
102. The Court refused to articulate a standard. The government had argued that "the
First Amendment, as applied in Pacifica, 'does not require that regulations of indecency on
television be subject to the strictest' First Amendment 'standard of review."' Id. at 755
(citation omitted). The Court declined to respond to the argument: "[We need not] determine
whether, or the extent to which, Pacifica does, or does not, impose some lesser standard of
review where indecent speech is at issue." Id (citation omitted).
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id.
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programming,"' were "significantly less restrictive than the provision here
at issue.'
0 5
The Dissent: Justice Thomas, again joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, found that § 10(b) "clearly implicates petitioners' free
speech rights . . . . Consequently, § 10(b) must be subjected to strict
scrutiny and can be upheld only if it furthers a compelling governmental
interest by the least restrictive means available."'' 0 6 Because the provision is
narrowly tailored to achieve a well-established compelling interest
(protecting children), Justice Thomas thought that the provision should be
upheld. He was not convinced that blocking and lockboxes "effectively
support[ed] parents' authority to direct the moral upbringing of their
children."' 7
3. Section 10(c)
A Plurality Opinion: Section 10(c) permitted cable operators to
prohibit indecent material on public access channels. Justice Breyer was
only able to marshal two other justices, Stevens and Souter, for his opinion
as to why § 10(c) violates the First Amendment. Again, without specifying
a level of scrutiny, the Justices concluded "that the Government cannot
sustain its burden of showing that § 10(c) is necessary to protect children or
that it is appropriately tailored to secure that end."' 08 Based on a review of
the legislative history of the statute and the record before the court, the
Justices found that the programming control systems then in place for
public access channels would normally avoid any child-related problems
with offending programming. 1°9 "In the absence of a factual basis
substantiating the harm and the efficacy of its proposed cure, we cannot
assume that the harm exists or that the regulation redresses it."" 0
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the
judgment that the provision was invalid but for different reasons. Justice
Kennedy was of the opinion that public access channels met the definition
of a public forum,"' and, as such, should be subjected to strict scrutiny."12
105. Id. at 756 (citation omitted). Section 505 was later held unconstitutional in United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000), which is discussed in greater detail
below.
106. Id. at 832 (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 833.
108. Id. at766.
109. Id. at 763-64.
110. Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys, v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-65 (1994)).
111. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 805.
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Section 10(c) could not survive constitutional muster because it was not
narrowly tailored to protect children from indecent programming.'13
C. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group
The Supreme Court again considered content-based regulation of
cable television in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group. In
another narrow five to four decision, the Court made clear, as it had not
done in Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions of cable
television." 4 The Court was considering Playboy's challenge to § 505 of
the 1996 Act, which required "cable television operators who provide
channels 'primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming' either to
'fully scramble or otherwise fully block' those channels or to limit their
transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing, set by
administrative regulation as the time between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m."
' 15
The Opinion of the Court: Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, seemed particularly troubled by
the fact that § 505 not only targeted specific content but also targeted
specific speakers. "The speech in question was not thought by Congress to
be so harmful that all channels were subject to restriction. Instead, the
statutory disability applies only to channels 'primarily dedicated to
sexually-oriented programming."'' 6 This focus on particular speakers was
of great concern to the Court because "[l]aws designed or intended to
suppress or restrict the expression of specific speakers contradict basic First
Amendment principles."
' 17
The Court then made clear that "[s]ince § 505 is a content-based
speech restriction, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny."'"18 As a
result, the standard of review was relatively straight forward. "If a statute
regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative
would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative. ' " 9 Ordinarily, shielding the sensibilities of listeners does not
qualify as a compelling governmental interest.
113. Id. at 806. The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas all voted to
uphold § 10(c).
114. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
115. Id. at 806 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1994); 47 C.F.R. § 76.227 (1999)).
116. Id. at 812 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1994)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 813 (citing Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
119. Id. at 813 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 847 (1997) ("[The CDA's Internet
indecency provisions'] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
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Our precedents teach these principles. Where the designed benefit of a
content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of
listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even
where no less restrictive alternative exists. We are expected to protect
our own sensibilities 'simply by averting [our] eyes.
But cable and broadcasting present special problems:
Here, of course, we consider images transmitted to some homes where
they are not wanted and where parents often are not present to give
immediate guidance. Cable television, like broadcast media, presents
unique problems, which inform our assessment of the interests at stake,
and which may justify restrictions that would be unacceptable in other
contexts. 121
Despite finding parallels between broadcasting and cable, the Court
concluded that strict scrutiny applies.
No one suggests the Government must be indifferent to unwanted,
indecent speech that comes into the home without parental consent.
The speech here, all agree, is protected speech; and the question is
what standard the Government must meet in order to restrict it. As we
consider a content-based regulation, the answer should be clear: The
standard is strict scrutiny. This case involves speech alone; and even
where speech is indecent and enters the home, the objective of
shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the
protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.
122
While the Court addressed the similar and "unique problems" of cable and
broadcasting, it nonetheless made clear that content-based cable regulation,
unlike broadcast, would be subjected to full strict scrutiny.
In fact, it was not the similarity of the two media but rather their
differences that dictated the outcome. "There is, moreover, a key difference
between cable television and the broadcasting media, which is the point on
which this case turns: Cable systems have the capacity to block unwanted
channels on a household-by-household basis."'123 The availability of a less
restrictive alternative enabled the Court to distinguish Pacifica.
The option to block reduces the likelihood, so concerning to the Court
in Pacifica, that traditional First Amendment scrutiny would deprive
the Government of all authority to address this sort of problem. The
corollary, of course, is that targeted blocking enables the Government
to support parental authority without affecting the First Amendment
interests of speakers and willing listeners-listeners for whom, if the
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted
to serve.").
120. Id. at 813 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); accord Erznoznik
v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 814.
123. Id. at 815.
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speech is unpopular or indecent, the privacy of their own homes may
be the optimal place of receipt.
124
Targeted blocking (contained in § 504 of the 1996 Act) was less restrictive
than the banning contemplated by § 505, and, therefore, § 505 could not be
sustained.
The burden of persuasion is clearly on the government. 125 "It was for
the Government, presented with a plausible, less restrictive alternative, to
prove the alternative to be ineffective, and § 505 to be the least restrictive
available means."'126 In the end, the government failed to prove that the
targeted blocking of § 504 would be an ineffective alternative to the
complete ban contained in § 505.127 "It is no response that voluntary
blocking requires a consumer to take action, or may be inconvenient, or
may not go perfectly every time. A court should not assume a plausible,
less restrictive alternative would be ineffective; and a court should not
presume parents, given full information, will fail to act."
'1 28
The majority also concluded that the government "failed to establish a
pervasive, nationwide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech
ban.', 129 The government had failed to present any evidence about the
extent of the signal bleed problem.13 ° "The First Amendment requires a
more careful assessment and characterization of an evil in order to justify a
regulation as sweeping as this."''
Concurring: Justice Thomas concurred in the outcome by noting that
the government should have defended the statute on the basis that at least
some of the speech was obscene and, hence, entitled to no First
Amendment protection. The "Government, having declined to defend the
statute as a regulation of obscenity, now asks us to dilute our stringent First
Amendment standards to uphold § 505 as a proper regulation of protected
(rather than unprotected) speech. I am unwilling to corrupt the First
Amendment to reach this result."' 13 2 Likewise, Justice Scalia, who also
joined Justice Breyer's dissent, wrote separately to express his "view that §
124. Id.
125. Id. at 818 ("When First Amendment compliance is the point to be proved, the risk
of nonpersuasion--operative in all trials-must rest with the Government, not with the
citizen.").
126. Id. at 823.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 824.
129. Id. at 823.
130. Id. at 821.
131. Id. at 819.
132. Id. at 830 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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505 can be upheld in simpler fashion: by finding that it regulates the
business of obscenity."'
133
The Dissent: Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, dissented. Justice Breyer appeared to accept
the application of strict scrutiny:
The basic, applicable First Amendment principles are not at issue. The
Court must examine the statute before us with great care to determine
whether its speech-related restrictions are justified by a 'compelling
interest,' namely, an interest in limiting children's access to sexually
explicit material. In doing so, it recognizes that the Legislature must
respect adults' viewing freedom by 'narrowly tailoring' the statute so
that it restricts no more speech than necessary, and choosing instead
any alternative that would further the compelling interest in a 'less
restrictive' but 'at least as effective' way.134
Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
government failed to establish a pervasive nationwide problem and that it
failed to prove the ineffectiveness of blocking technology. 135 He was not
convinced that the blocking scheme contemplated by § 504 amounted to a
"'less restrictive,' but similarly practical and effective, way to accomplish §
505's child-protecting objective., 136 Justice Breyer then offered further
elaboration:
The words I have just emphasized, 'similarly' and 'effective,' are
critical. In an appropriate case they ask a judge not to apply First
Amendment rules mechanically, but to decide whether, in light of the
benefits and potential alternatives, the statute works speech-related
harm (here to adult speech) out of proportion to the benefits that the
statute seeks to provide (here, child protection). 137
Section 504 was simply not an adequate alternative in the eyes of the
dissent.
Section 504's opt-out right works only when parents (1) become aware
of their § 504 rights, (2) discover that their children are watching
sexually explicit signal 'bleed,' (3) reach their cable operator and ask
that it block the sending of its signal to their home, (4) await
installation of an individual blocking device, and, perhaps (5) (where
the block fails or the channel number changes) make a new request. 138
These steps, among other things, meant, in his judgment, that the § 504
blocking scheme was not an effective alternative to § 505.139
133. Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 836 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referencing majority opinion).
135. Id. at 839-840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 840 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority).
137. Id. at 841.
138. Id. at 843.
139. Id at 845.
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D. The Internet Cases: Reno v. ACLU and Ashcroft v. ACLU
The Supreme Court's response to congressional attempts to regulate
Internet speech also provides additional insight into how it would consider
attempts to extend the broadcast indecency regime to satellite and cable. In
1997, Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by six additional Justices
(Justices Scalia, Souter, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer), found
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA")
unconstitutional.1 40 The provisions of the CDA before the Court in Reno v.
ACLU sought "to protect minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive'
communications on the Internet" by prohibiting or otherwise limiting
children's access to such content. 14 1 The indecency definition in that case
was virtually identical to the Commission's broadcast indecency definition.
The Court concluded that the indecency restriction was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.1
42
With respect to the vagueness challenge, the Court was troubled by
the statute's lack of precision. In one section, the CDA referred to
"indecent" material, while in another section it spoke "of material that 'in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or execratory activities or
organs."",143 Since neither term ("indecent" or "patently offensive") was
defined, the Court concluded that "this difference in language will provoke
uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards relate to each
other and just what they mean."'144 Furthermore, "[t]his uncertainty
undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the
congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful
materials."'' 45 Because of the "vague contours of the coverage of the statute
... .[the Court had] further reason for insisting that the statute not be
overly broad."'
146
As it examined the breadth of the statute, the Court again noted that
the First Amendment protects indecent sexual expression so long as it is
not obscene. 47 "It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials. But
140. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
141. Id. at 849.
142. Id. at 875.
143. Id. at 871 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1994)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 874.
147. Id. at 874-75 (quoting Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127
(1989); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) ("[W]here
obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may
be offensive to some does not justify its suppression.")).
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that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech
addressed to adults.' 48 Because of the breadth of the content-based
restrictions contained in the CDA, the government was faced with the
heavy burden of explaining why a less restrictive alternative would not be
as effective-a burden it was unable to satisfy. 49 "Particularly in the light
of the absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even hearings
addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded that the
CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all."'5 °
The Court rejected restricting the protections for cyber speech in a fashion
similar to broadcasting.
The special factors recognized in some of the Court's cases as
justifying regulation of the broadcast media-the history of extensive
government regulation of broadcasting, the scarcity of available
frequencies at its inception, and its 'invasive' nature-are not present
in cyberspace. Thus, these cases provide no basis for qualifying the
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to the
Interet. 1
5 1
In June of 2004, the Court again considered the constitutionality of a
congressional attempt to regulate Internet speech, this time with the Child
Online Protection Act ("COPA")--a congressional rework of the CDA in
light of Reno. In Ashcrofi v. ACLU, another closely divided Court (five to
four) affirmed a lower court's injunction which prohibited enforcement of
the Act. 52 Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas,
and Ginsburg) concluded that the government had not shown that blocking
and filtering were less effective than COPA's prohibition on the "knowing
posting, for 'commercial purposes,' of World Wide Web content that is
'harmful to minors."
'
"153
The closest precedent on the general point is our decision in Playboy
Entertainment Group. Playboy Entertainment Group, like this case,
involved a content-based restriction designed to protect minors from
viewing harmful materials. The choice was between a blanket speech
restriction and a more specific technological solution that was available
to parents who chose to implement it. Absent a showing that the
proposed less restrictive alternative would not be as effective, we
concluded, the more restrictive option preferred by Congress could not
survive strict scrutiny. In the instant case, too, the Government has
148. Id. at 875 (citation omitted) (citing Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978)).
149. Id. at 879.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 845 (citations omitted).
152. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
153. Id. at 661 (citing Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)
(1998)).
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failed to show, at this point, that the proposed less restrictive
alternative will be less effective. The reasoning of Playboy
Entertainment Group and the holdings and force of our precedents
require us to affirm the preliminary injunction. To do otherwise would
be to do less than the First Amendment commands.
154
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor. He felt that "[f]iltering software, as presently available, does not
solve the 'child protection' problem."' '55 He identified four "serious
inadequacies"
' 1 6
First, its filtering is faulty, allowing some pornographic material to
pass through without hindrance .... Second, filtering software costs
money. Not every family has the $40 or so necessary to install it ....
Third, filtering software depends upon parents willing to decide where
their children will surf the Web and able to enforce that decision ....
Fourth, software blocking lacks precision, with the result that those
who wish to use it to screen out pornography find that it blocks a great
deal of material that is valuable."
He concluded, "[t]here is no serious, practically available 'less
restrictive' way similarly to further this compelling interest [protecting
children from the exposure to commercial pornography]. Hence the Act is
constitutional."'' 58 Justice Scalia also dissented but would not have
subjected the statute to strict scrutiny since the statute covered commercial
pornography, a category of speech that, according to him, is
constitutionally unprotected. 5 9 Nevertheless, the Court again, by the
narrowest of margins (a vote of five to four), found that Congress had
overstepped its authority in attempting to protect children from harmful
materials.
VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF DBS PROVIDERS
The High Court has yet to consider whether DBS is entitled to the
same First Amendment protection as cable television. In view of the
Court's analysis in Turner I, which, as discussed above, rejected the
application of Red Lion's spectrum scarcity rationale to the regulation of
cable, we see no basis for differing treatment of DBS and cable under the
First Amendment. Given that DBS offers a very robust platform, we
believe that the Court is very likely to accord equal First Amendment rights
to DBS and cable television.
154. Id. at 670 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 684 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 685.
158. Id. at689.
159. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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At least two lower federal courts, however, have considered the First
Amendment rights of DBS. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit concluded that DBS, like over-the-air broadcasting, is
constrained by the limited availability of spectrum and should be afforded
lesser First Amendment protections. In Time Warner v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit in 1996 upheld, over a First Amendment challenge, a law that
required DBS providers to set aside a percentage of their channel capacity
for noncommercial, educational, and informational programming. 60 The
court decided that "the same relaxed standard of scrutiny that the court has
applied to traditional broadcast media" should be applied to the DBS set-
aside provision at issue.
161
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit, citing Turner 1, five years later
concluded that "both satellite carriers and cable operators engage in speech
protected by the First Amendment when they exercise editorial discretion
over the menu of channels they offer to their subscribers. ' 62 Finding that
the carry-one, carry-all rule under attack by DBS carriers was a content-
neutral restriction, the Fourth Circuit, like the Court in Turner I, applied
intermediate First Amendment scrutiny under United States v. O'Brien and
upheld the provision as a reasonable restriction on speech.
163
Since Pacifica, neither the Commission nor the courts have sought to
justify regulation of indecent content on broadcasting on the basis of
spectrum scarcity. As Justice Brennan noted in Pacifica, "[t]he opinions of
my Brothers Powell and Stevens rightly refrain from relying on the notion
of 'spectrum scarcity' to support their result. As Chief Judge Bazelon noted
below, 'although scarcity has justified increasing the diversity of speakers
and speech, it has never been held to justify censorship."" 64 Since its 1987
decision to abolish the fairness doctrine, the Commission has not defended
content (as opposed to structural) regulation on the basis of spectrum
scarcity. 65 As discussed above, the FCC, moreover, has declined to
160. See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (1996).
161. Id. at975.
162. Satellite Broad. & Commc'ns Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 352-53 (4th Cir.
2001) (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636-37 (1994)).
163. Id. at 366. See also supra text accompanying note 78. "Carry-one, carry-all" refers
to the obligation of a DBS operator who voluntarily decides to carry one local station in a
market under the statutory copyright license to carry, subject to certain limitations, all the
requesting stations in that market. See Satellite Broad. and Commc'ns Ass'n v. FCC, 275
F.3d 337, 349 (2001).
164. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770, n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original)).
165. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert denied,
493 U.S. 1019 (1990); see also John W. Berresford, The Scarcity Rationale for Regulating
Traditional Broadcasting: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, FCC MEDIA BUREAU STAFF
RESEARCH PAPER, (FCC, D.C.), Mar. 2005, at 28 ("[T]he Commission's authority in this
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regulate subscription services (e.g., DBS, satellite radio, and subscription
television), despite their use of spectrum, because they are not as accessible
to children as broadcasting.
Likewise, in Denver Area, discussed above, the plurality opinion
noted that, though spectrum scarcity continued to justify the "structural
regulations at issue [in Turner 1] (the 'must carry' rules), it has little to do
with a case that involves the effects of television viewing on children.
Those effects are the result of how parents and children view television
programming, and how pervasive and intrusive that programming is.' 66 In
according full First Amendment rights four years later in Playboy and
mandating strict scrutiny of content regulation of cable, moreover, the
Court compared cable to broadcasting and found that broadcasting presents
"unique problems" that may provide a basis for restrictions that would be
intolerable in another context. 67 "No one suggests the Government must be
indifferent to unwanted, indecent speech that comes into the home without
parental consent.' ' 168 While the Court found "a key difference" between
cable and broadcasting, it was not spectrum scarcity, but rather the ability
of subscribers to block unwanted channels. 169 Because DBS has even more
effective parental controls than were available to subscribers in 2000 when
the Court decided Playboy, we believe that the Court is likely to treat
regulation of content on DBS no less favorably than cable under the First
Amendment. Cable and DBS should both be afforded full First Amendment
protections.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the debate over television decency intensifies, and many push to
extend current broadcast indecency regulation to DBS and other platforms,
Congress and regulators should recognize the likely constitutional
infirmities associated with such an approach. While the Supreme Court has
yet to consider whether DBS is entitled to the same First Amendment
protection as cable television, in view of the Court's analysis in Turner I,
we see no basis for differing treatment. There, the Court eschewed its
"distinct approach to broadcast regulation" and afforded full constitutional
protection to cable based upon its conclusion that there was no practical
area [(indecency)] is not expressly premised on The Scarcity Rationale."); see also Angie A.
Welbom & Henry Cohen, Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: Background and Legal
Analysis 25 (Mar. 30, 2005) (Congressional Research Service, Order No. RL32222),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44236.pdf.
166. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm's. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 748
(1996).
167. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
168. Id. at 814.
169. Id. at 815.
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limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable medium. 170
Given that DBS offers a very robust platform, we believe that the Court is
likely to accord DBS the same First Amendment rights as cable television.
With DBS and cable subjected to full First Amendment protection,
any attempt to regulate indecency on either platform would surely run afoul
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has been strongly skeptical of
content-based regulation of cable, and it would be very difficult for the
Court to depart from its holdings in Playboy (strict scrutiny applies to cable
television) and Reno (indecency standard is both inherently vague and
overbroad). Given the availability of an effective and less restrictive
alternative to content regulation (i.e., parental content controls), we believe
that the Court, consistent with Playboy, would strike down any regulation
of indecency on DBS or cable.
170. Turner1, 512 U.S. at 637.
[Vol. 60
